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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM K. HOWARD, RUTH N.
HOWARD, ROBERT D. HO\VARD,
and SI-IIRLEY L. HOWARD,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-vs.-

1\fiLDRED M. HOWARD,
Defendant and Appellant.

MILDRED M. HOWARD,
Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.
9552

-vs.-

WALI(ER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, as Administrator of the estate
of L. \V. HOWARD, deceased, WILLIA~f l(. HOWARD, RUT H N.
HOWARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD
and SHIRLEY L. HOWARD,
Third-Party Defendants,
and Respo-ndents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Respondents agree with Appellant's Statement of
the Case, Disposition of the Case by the Lower Court,
the Statement of Facts, and that the relief sought by
appellant is correctly set forth in her Statement of Relief
Sought on Appeal.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON BY
RESPONDENTS
POINT 1.
DECEDENT INTENDED TO DO WHAT HE DID DO,
TO-WIT: DELIBERATELY EXECUTE A VOID DEED.
POINT 2.
IF DECEDENT INTENDED TO EXECUTE A DEED IT
WAS WITH TESTAME.NTARY INTENT AND WAS NOT INTENDED AS A PRESENT CONVEYANCE OF A PRESENT
INTEREST.
POINT 3.
SAID DEED, AS.~ TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF
ESTATE, IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO REFORMATION.
POINT 4.
INTENT TO MAKE A GIFT IS NO·T. SUFFICIENT IF
THE GIFT IS NOT ACTUALLY CONSUMMATED DURING
THE LIFETIME OF THE DONOR.
POINT 5..
EQUITY WILL NO·T REFORM A GIFT DEED WHEN TO
DO SO WILL CAUSE GROSS INJUSTICE SUCH AS DISINHERITING THE NATURAL HEIRS OF THE DONOR.
POINT 6.THE DEED IS VOID BECAUSE. IT DOES NOT CLOSE
AND SHO·WS NO INTE-NT TO CLOSE BECAUSE IT DOES
NOT GO BACK TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING.
POINT 7.
THE DEED IS .ALSO FATALLY DEFECTIVE IN THAT
IT CONTAINS AN IRRECONCILABLE AMBIGUITY.
POINT 8.
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE RESORTED TO
TO REFORM A DEED CONTAINING A PATENT DEFECT
UNLESS SOMETHING IN THE DEED FURNISHES THE
KEY TO RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITY.
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POINT 9.
ATTEMPTED CONVEYANCE OF A SPECIFIC PORTION
OF A LARGER 'TRACT IS VOID FOR UNCERTAINTY IF
THE PORTION IS NOT SPECIFICALLY DEFINED.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
DECEDENT INTENDED 'TO DO WHAT HE DID DO,
TO-WIT: DELIBERATELY EXECUTE A VOID DEED.

Lucas William Howard, the grantor in the deed
which is the subject of this action, is not with us to clarify
his intent. His intent can only be determined from what
he did. T·he appellant blithely determines this "intent" to
suit herself. Throughout her brief there are many s~ate
ments such as "it is clearly shown that he intended," "the
grantor was intending," ''it is evident he intended,'' "he
thought he had," etc. An analysis of the instrument does
not show any such intention as ap·pellant claims.
It is the firm belief of respondents that their father
intended to do exactly what he did do, viz., make a void
deed. Why would he do this~ Simply to satisfy his wife
and lead her to believe that she had succeeded in obtaining
her husband's entire estate, or virtually all of it, thereby
depriving her step-children of any share in their father's
estate. The decedent did what he did in order that he
might have a little p·eace at home during his declining
years. With the lmowledge that the deed was void he
could keep his wif~ satisfied and yet feel assured that
his children, the issue of his "first love" would partici-
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pate, at least to an extent, in his estate. His wife, the
step-mother of respondents, had already extracted from
him, by means of joint tenancy, a fortune vastly in excess
of anything she would require during her remaining lifetime. Had it been the decedent's intent to give her all, that
could likewise have been readily accomplished by placing
the property in question likewise in joint tenancy. But
that he did not do. He was able, by executing a deed,
knowingly incomplete, to both satisfy his wife and assure
something over for his children.
That this was his intent is further evidenced by the
fact that two years after executing this deed, he, apparently having in mind the invalidity of this deed, made
another deed to his wife, specifically describing the home,
the property thus later conveyed being a portion of the
tract partially described in the first deed.
POINT 2.
IF DECEDENT INTENDED TO EXECUTE A DEED IT
WAS WITH TESTAMENTARY INTENT AND WAS NOT INTENDED AS A PRESENT CONVEYANCE OF A PRESENT
INTEREST.

That the purported deed was in reality intended as a
testamentary disposition and not as a present gift of a
present interest is evidence by Appellant's Brief. On
page 3 of her brief appellant states : "The deed was delivered to appellant with instructions to place the same
of record in the office of the County Recorder of Salt
Lake County, Utah, upon the death of L .W. Howard."
L. W. Howard, the grantor, died Nov. 30, 1955. (App.
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Brief pg 2) The deed was recorded next day, Dec. 1,
1955. (App. Brief pg. 3.)
That said deed was intended to be testamentary only,
and \Vas not intended to convey a present interest at the
tin1e of execution, is further evidenced by the fact that
on ~1:ay 13, 1947, the decedent made another deed to his
wife, describing a portion of the property described in
the first (testamentary) deed 'vhich \vas already in existence. (See App. Brief, pgs 3-4.) If the first deed was
intended to be other than testamentary, why rlid he execute the second deed'
The question of law here involved has already been
ruled upon by the Utah Supreme Court in Stanley v.
Stanley, 94 P2 465, 97 U 250, the syllabus of which reads
as follo,vs :
''In quiet title action involving question
whether testator had delivered deed to widow
with i'ntent f;o presently pas.s title, evidence sustained trial court's finding that deed had not been
delivered with such intent even if widow had been
permitted to testify as to the manual delivery of
the deed."

POINT 3.
SAID DEED, AS A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF
ESTATE, IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO REFORMATION.

Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition, \T ol. 1, Chap. 8,
page 333, Sec. 167 cites the rule:
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"Where the will as drawn and executed varies
from testators instructions and actual wishes, disappointed legatees and devisees have frequently
invoked the jurisdiction of equity to grant reformation, or some relief analagous thereto.
Equity has regularly refused to grant reformation." (Emphasis added.)
Numerous cases, from 16 states, are cited in support of
this rule, including new cases cited in the pocket parts.
Continuing, in the same section, discussing the matters which equity will not reform, Page, on page 335,
states further :
''For some or all of these reasons equity will
not grant reformation in case of misdescription
of realty devised, (note 7) or an omission of part
of the realty which testator meant to devise. (note
8)."
Further:
"It has been said that a court of equity has no
jurisdiction to reform a will and that if such a
court enters a decree of reformation, such decree
may be attacked collaterally (note 12)."
POINT 4.
INTENT TO MAKE A GIFT IS NOT SUFFICIENT IF
THE GIFT IS NOT ACTUALLY CONSUMMATED DURING
THE LIFETIME OF THE DONOR.

C.J.S. cites the following rule on gifts:
"To be effective, a gift must go into immediate and present effect. A 1nere intention to make
a gift, however clearly expressed, 'vhich has not
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been carried into effect amounts to nothing, and
confers no rights in the subject matter of the proposed gift on the intended donee." 38 CJS 793.
Further:
"In any event, a delivery to be sufficient to
support a gift must be absolute and unqualified;
it must transfer possession to the donee, and vest
in him a present and irrevocable title; it must vest
the donee with and divest the donor of control and
dominion over the property.'' 38 CJS 798.
That the gift to respondents' step-mother was not
consummated is evidenced by appellant's request to the
court to reform the deed. No title-examiner would
pass a title resting on an ambiguous deed, containing a
description which did not purport to close. Regardless
of decedent's intent the fact remains that he did not make
a valid conveyance, sufficient to pass title, without reformation of the deed.
The court could be certain as to the intent of the
grantor, and yet if the grantor did not carry that intent
into effect the court would be powerless to consummate
the gift.
"Intent alone is not sufficient to create rights,
but the intent must be carried into effect by acts
which are legally sufficient to accomplish the intended purpose." Strout v. Burgess, 112 ALR2
939, 144 Me. 263, 68 A2 241.
POINT 5.
EQUITY WILL NOT REFORM A GIFT DEED WHEN TO
DO SO WILL CAUSE GROSS INJUSTICE SUCH AS DISINHERITING THE NATURAL HEIRS OF THE DONOR.
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On page 21 of her brief appellant cites two cases as
authority for the statement that equity will reform a
description in favor of a donee in a deed of gift. This is
the rule only in exceptional cases, but it is not the general
rule. These two cases will be later discussed, but first
let us set forth the general rule. It is stated by A.L.R. as
follows:
''Courts will not reform purely voluntary conveyances. " 69 A.L.R. 419.
In Lytle v. Hulen, 128 Ore. 483, 275 P.45, 114 ALR
596 the court quotes with approval, the rule as set forth
in Story's Equity Jurisprudence. The court said:
"The rule is stated in 2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence (14th Edn) Sec. 982, thus: 'The right
to correct ;J,nd reform a written instrument executed by mistake or fraud is one that attaches primarily to conveyances to which the injured party
stands as a bona fide purchaser for value and
does not apply, as a general rule, \\7here the conveyance is the evidence of the bounty of the grantor, and a mere gratuity as to the grantee. The
grantor, if living, could not be compelled to correct the deed; and in the absence of consent of all
the parties equity will not grant the relief."
This case has been cited with approval in the following
later cases: 3 P2 7rl3, 35 P2 250; 40 P2 1015; 73 F2 570;
93 F2 788; 22 S2 226; 12 SE2 210; 6 SE2 26; 29 SE2
67 4; 56 SE2 342.
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Third Edition,
Vol. 6, page 1144, Sec. 679 sets forth the rule:
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"No relief will be awarded to a grantee in an
imperfect conveyance which is not supported by
either a valuable or meritorious consideration
against either the grantor or his representatives."
This is supported by quotations from sixteen cases. The
reason for the rule, and the justice of the rule is explained
by Pomeroy in Vol. 2 of Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence,
Third Edition, Sec. 588, page 958, as follows:
"All agreements, so far as the binding efficacy of their promises is concerned, must be referred to one or the other of three causes, - a
valuable consideration, a mere voluntary bounty,
or the performance of a moral duty. The first
alone is binding at law, and enables the promisee
to enforce the obligation against the promisor.
The second, while the promise is executory, is a
mere nullity, both at law and equity. The third
constitutes the meritorious or imperfect consideration of equity and is recognized as effective by it
within very narrow limits, although not at all by
the law."
It will be observed that the gift to the appellant falls
1n the second classification, \vhich Pomeroy calls "A
mere nullity, both at law and equity.
Tiffany, Third Edition, Vol. 4, page 80, declares the
rule to be:
"According to the weight of authority it (reformation) will not be given as against the heirs
or devisees of a deceased donor by reason of the
failure of the language of the conveyance to express the donor's probable intention."
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Ten cases are cited in support of this rule. It would unduly increase this already large brief if the various cases
establishing this rule were individually quoted from and
discussed. The justice of the rule is obvious. Where
the authorities unanimously state the general rule analysis of the individual cases is only cumulative. It is, however in order, for respondent to comment on the two
cases cited by appellant.
Appellant first cites the case of Hazlitt v. Bryan,
192 Tenn. 251, 241 SW2 121. In this case the court merely discusses the 1natter of jurisdiction of the equity
court and does not give enough facts from which the
rights of the litigants might be ascertained, but it does
quote 'vith approval, and as authority for its ruling,
Dowd.ing v. Dowding, 152 Neb. 61, 40 NW2 245, as
follows:
"If there is equity in plaintiff's case as
against the rights asserted by the defendants a
reformation should be decreed. If plaintiff's case
is lacking ,in the elements that go to move the
conscience of a court of equity, relief should be
denied on that ground, but not for want of jurisdiction in the court because of the voluntary nature of the conveyance."
Obviously the Do\\~ding case came under the third classification outlined by Pomeroy hereinabove, "the perforinance of a moral duty," and likely, if the facts were
known, the Hazlitt case 'vould also fall into that classification.
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Let us briefly refer to the equities in this case. If
defendant prevails she will receive from the estate of
Lucas W. Howard not only all of the joint tenancy property, \\'"hich 'vas a fortune in itself, including a bank account in excess of $15,000.00, and not only the statutory
one-third which the Utah law considers to be her rightful share of the estate. In addition to these she \Yill receive, for herself, n.lone, to the exclusion of the children,
a tract appraised at $84,000.00 all of \vhich was owned by
decedent long prior to his marriage to appellant. The
inventory in the estate lists assets in the sum of $117,690.00 exclusive of joint tenancy property. Of this $117,690.00 the appellant claims as her own all but $17,060.00.
(a) If the deed is reformed appellant will
receive this $100,000.00, plus one third of the remainder, and the balance, if there is any balance
at all after paying from this remainder, the taxes,
costs of administration, etc., will be divided among
the children.
(b) If the deed is rejected as invalid appellant will receive, in addition to the joint tenancy property, one-third of the whole estate, and
the children will divide the balance.
Does this justify equity in using its extraordinary
po,vers to make a gift, where it is not even clear that a
gift was intended'
The other case cited by appellant, Launderville v.
Mero, ~Iontana, 281 Pac. 749, 69 A.L.R. 416. ALR, in
reporting this case, at page 427 shows that this case is
contrary to the general rule, which is stated as follows:
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''The weight of authority supports the view
that the grantee is not entitled to a reformation
of a voluntary conveyance made without any
consideration, as against the heirs of the grantor
after the latter's death."
Particularly is this the case where the grantee is also
an heir. Page 428 of 69 A.L.R. states:
"According to the weight of authority, equity
will not reform a voluntary conveyance not supported by any consideration, at the suit of the
grantee, who is an heir of the grantor, as against
the other heirs of the deceased grantor."
It is not considered helpful here to further prolong this
brief by quoting the cases relied upon and cited by A.L.R.
There are exceptions to this rule, as in the case cited by
defendant at 69 A.L.R. 416 (Launderville v. 1l! ero, supra)
where the other heirs are provided for, and where the
deed to be reforJJ~ed is one of a group or series; but that
is not the case in the action now before the court, and
equity and justice combine to de1nand that the general
rule be followed and the children be allo,Yed to inherit
their rightful estate.
Because appellant seeks to lend 'veight to the Launderville case, by tying it to the footnotes of the l:tah code,
brief 1nention of that case is in order. In the Launderville
case the grantor deeded all of his lands to his three
daughters. All \Yent into possession of their respective
tracts. The grantor testified "he didn't have an acre to
his nan1e," after the conveyances "~ere 1nade. After his
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death it was discovered that one of the deeds 'vas defective. The court properly amended it to give effect to the
series of deeds, and to do equity between the sisters. With
that law, as it applied to that case, respondent's have
no quarrel. It is another of the type of cases referred to
by Pomeroy, where there is "a moral duty." No such
equities exist in the case now before the court.
POINT 6.
THE DEED IS VOID BECAUSE IT DOES NOT CLOSE
AND SHO·WS NO INTENT TO CLOSE BECAUSE IT DOES
NOT GO BACK TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING.
POINT 7.
THE DEED IS ALSO FATALLY DEFECTIVE IN THAT
IT CONTAINS AN IRRECONCILABLE AMBIGUITY.

Points 6 and 7 both pertain to the description in the
deed. In order to avoid duplication it is deemed advisable
to discuss both together, and at the same time to point
out the weaknesses of appellants arguments in the five
points relied upon by her, all of which pertain to the
description in the deed.
To make out a valid description appellant would
have the court discard entirely three courses, as "superfluous," extend another course to reach the ''intended"
corner, and then supply a course entirely missing, to
bring the description back to the starting point and make
it enclose something. This is an effort to create something out of nothing. There are many cases in the records
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where the courts have supplied a missing part, or corrected an incorrect course or distance; but nowhere, at
any time, have the courts so completely reconstruted an
instrument as appellants now ask.
First of all, may the courts discard the portion of
the description which reads: "to a point which is South
55°30' W 455 ft thence S 46°25' E 154 ft thence S
43°35' West 160 feet more or less from beginning"~
Such course, if traced back from the point of beginning,
would bring one fairly close to the northwest corner of
what appellant calls the west jog. Rather than discard
this portion of the description the decisions of the court
are to the effect that this portion of the description would
take precedence over the other courses. The three
courses, which appellant would have the court discard,
fix a definite point to which the other direction and distance must yield. A line going to a definite fixed point
goes to that point and direction and distance must yield
to this fixed point. Such a point is called a locative call
and takes precedence over a directory or descriptive
call. See 11 CJS Sec. 47, n. 9, page 597, and numerous
cases there cited.
Appellant would have us believe that when decedent
wrote "from beginning" he thought he had described
"to the place of beginning." Respondents cannot believe
that their father was so ignorant that he did not lmow the
difference between "to" and "from." When he wrote
"from beginning" he certainly did not believe that he
was writing "to beginning."
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Respondents have no quarrel with the law cited by
appellant in her argument of her Point II, but the application of the law cited to the facts now before the court
does not help appellant's position.
The reference to Brose v. Boise City RR, 5 Idaho 695
is ludicrous. How can appellant seriously assert that the
Ho,vard description after discarding the locative calls
"is otherwise complete and accurate"~ Or can she assert
that this deed ''contains two descriptions, one of which
describes the land with reasonable certainty''~ Is this
description made any more reasonable and certain by
discarding the locative calls than it would be by discarding any other courses~ Discard the claimed surplusage
and what is left; only a shoestring, which encloses nothing
and which shows no intent on the part of the grantor
to enclose anything nor to return to the point of be. .
ginning.
Appellant in the lower court, and in her brief, claims
that a surveyor could locate the description on the land.
Respondents agree with the statement of the law that
where that can be done the court may, under some circumstances, but not all, correct the description accordingly. But surveyors are not magicians, and they can no
more create something out of nothing than can the members of the court. T·rue, a surveyor could lay out the
north line, and the lines along Holladay Boulevard and
Arbor Lane; but where does he go from there 1 Does he
go X 46°25' W 404 feet, up through the middle of the
tract, or does he go to the point definitely located by the
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next three calls~ The surveyor has no power to follo'v the
one and reject the other. Who is he to try to divine the
mind of the decedent~ If the court cannot do it a surveyor cannot do it. This is a patent ambiguity which renders the description absolutely void and not susceptible
of correction.
In 68 A.L.R. 12 there is an extensive compilation of
cases from which the following rule is derived:
"A patent ambiguity in the description of
land in a deed or mortgage is such an uncertainty
appearing on the face of the instrument that the
court, reading the language in the light of all the
facts and circumstances referred to in the instrument, (emphasis added) is unable to derive therefrom the intention of the parties as to what land
was to be conveyed. This type of ambiguity cannot be removed by parol evidence (emphasis added) since that would necessitate inserting ne'Y
language into the instrument, which under the
parol evidence rule is not permitted."
Referring to a patent ambiguity the California Supreme Court held, in Edu)(zrds v. Ci:ty of Santa Paula
(1956) 292 P2 31, 35 :
"A description that is equally applicable to
two different parcels is fatally defective." . A. uthorities cited.
In the case before the court it 'vould be possible,
by discarding the locative calls, extending the "Testerly
line, and adding a closing course or courses, to create

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
a description that would enclose a tract of land; but
without doing any greater violence to the deed it would
be just as feasible to discard as surplusage the course
running N 46°:25' .,V 404 feet, and then add a fe,v courses,
and thereby enclose a different tract of land; or by discarding the third course, there by rnoving the "\vest line
east"'ard by 6.15 ('hains, the tract would ahnost close;
but actually 'vhere a patent ambiguity exists the court
may do none of these things, because, in each case, it
'vould be creating a description where none now exists.
There are numerous cases in support of the foregoing
statement of law. Only t"\\ro 'vill be referred to, by "\Vay
of illustration. In Carson v. Palmer (Fla. 1939) 190 So.
720, 722, the court held :
~'A

deed which on its face contains t"\vo inconsistent descriptions, either of which would
identify a different parcel of property from that
described by the other, is void for uncertainty;
provided there be not other language in the instnlment "\Vhich sho"\vs the grantor's intent sufficiently
for the court to determine which piece or parcel
was intended to be conveyed."
In W. T. Carter and Bro. v. Ewers, 131 SW2 86 the
court states the rule :
"The rule that a description in a deed that is
uncertain may be made certain by the aid of extrinsic evidence has no application in the present
case, for the reason that the 'vords used by the
grantors are themselves indeterminative, and
there is no language in the deed 'vhich furnishes
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a key whereby extrinsic evidence can make certain
the extent of the interest purported to be conveyed."
From the cases previously cited herein, and other
such cases, it is obvious that the District Court did not
err in declining to assign the case for trial, and in rejecting the proffered testimony of ~fr. Bush. Parol evidence
not being admissible to clear a patent ambiguity, as above
set forth, and Mr. Bush having no authority or ability
to say what should be deleted and what should be added
to the description in order to create a valid description,
there was nothing to be accomplished by a trial. The
court could rule upon the matter summarily, as a matter
of law, as it did. It may very well be, as appellant contends, that summary proceedings are not favored, but
they do definitely have a place in the la,v, and are to be
used by the court \vhere circumstances justify, and this
is such a case.
In the final portion of appellant's argument on her
Point IV she raises a ne'v question. Devlin says that
when a deed is uncertain reference may be made to prior
deeds. Appellant says the deed by 'vhich L. "\\T. Howard
took title may be referred to. Respondents cannot see
how this can aid the court either to determine "~hether
to cut up through the middle of the tract with the course
running N 46°25' W, or whether to go around to the
westerly corner of the jog and stop there. Would reference to the deed under 'vhich l\[r. Ho,vard acquired title
clear the patent ambiguity created by a course running
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'~ N

46°25' 'V"

~'to''

a point definitely located else,vhere 1

No!
POINT 8.
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE RESORTED TO
TO REFORM A DEED CONTAINING A PATEN'T DEFECT
UNLESS SOMETHING IN THE DEED FURNISHES THE
KEY TO RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITY.

This point has already been touched upon in quotations pertaining to points 6 and 7, supra. The rule, as
set forth in 68 A.L.R. 12 is quoted on page 16 herein. The
rule may also be found in CJS, where it is stated:
"Although such extrinsic evidence must be
sufficient to establish the identity of the land
sought to be conveyed it must not ~add to, enlarge,
or in any way change the description contained in
the conveyance, and the writing itself must furnish the hinge or hook on 'vhich to hang the aid
thus afforded, without resorting to any secret
or undisclosed intention of the parties thereto."
26 CJS 646.
Further:
"If the deed contains inconsistent descriptions, either of which is sufficient to identify different parcels of property, and there is nothing
to show the grantor's intention, the deed is void
for uncertainty." 26 CJS 647.
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The reason for the foregoing rule is set forth in a
Georgia case, Shiver v. Young, 144 SE 129, 38 GA App.
409, as follows :
"If the written description is altogether general and does not point the 'vay for definition
by extrinsic evidence, use of such evidence would
be to add to and enlarge the terms of the written
description, and not merely to clarify it."
In Baldwim v. Hinton, 90 SE2 316 the court said:
''The description must identify the land or it
must refer to something that will identify it with
certainty. Otherwise the description is void for
uncertainty. Parol evidence is admissible to fit
the description to this land. Such evidence cannot
be used, however, to enlarge the scope of the descriptive words. rfhe ~deed itself nttlSt poi,nt to the
source from 'vhich evidence aluinde to make the
deed complete is to be sought. North Carolina Self
Help Co. v. Brinkley, 215 NC 615, 2 SE2 889,
892.''
Edw.ards v. City of Santa Pa1tla, 292 P2 31 has been
previously mentioned. A further quotation from that case
will explain wherein extrinsic evidence may and may not
be used. The court said :

"Parol evidence is al,Yays admissible in aid of
application of the description to its subject matter, but not for tlzc purpose of con1pleting a description which is inherently not susceptible of
application to tli e ground. The distinction is illustrated in Best v. Wohlford, supra, 14-! Cal. at page
737, 78 P at page 29-!: 'Parol evidence "Till not
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be admitted to help out a defective description,
or to sho"\v the intention with which it was made,
or to resolve an ambiguity in its tern1s; but the
rule that the description rnust be certain and definite and sufficient in itself to identify the land,
does not exclude evidence for the purpose of
applying the description to the surface of the
earth, and thus identifying it with the tract in
controversy. If a monument is given as the starting point, evidence may be given to show its location, but if the direction of the course from that
monument is not given, evidence will not be received to show what direction was intended. If the
land is described by some name or designation,
evidence 'vill be received for the purpose of showing that the tract in controversy was well and
generally known by that name or designation."
Edu,ards v. City of Santa Paula, 292 P2 31, 34.
The Oklahoma Supre1ne Court stated the rule:
~'Equity

will never receive parol evidence
to both describe the land and then apply the description." Syllabus. Powers v. Rwde, 79 P. 89, 14
Okla. 381.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has held:
"Where the language is patently ambiguous
parol evidence is not admissible to aid the description.'' Stewart v. Cary, 220 N.C. 214; 17 SE 2
29; 144 ALR 1287.
Appellant, in her brief cites numerous cases where
extrinsic evidence has been permitted in construction of
a deed. It is not difficult to find such cases, but a careful
examination thereof \vill sho\v that the evidence never
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was admitted to create a description, but merely to explain something to which the deed itself makes reference,
and which gives the key to the construction.
Appellant cites Devlin and Deal v. Cooper, but in the
case relied upon by Devlin the missing call could be
supplied by rever~ing the calls, and in Deal v. Cooper,
the deed afforded "sufficient data to. supply the omission." In each case it was a matter of construction of data
in the deed, and not a rna tter of "destruction, extension,
and creation" to create a description.
Appellant next quotes voluminously from Losee v.
Jones, 120 U. 385, 235 P2 132, 137. Respondents believe
that an analysis of the Losee case will, rather than support appellants position, show that the District Court \Yas
correct in ruling against the appellant. In the Losee case
there was a positive delivery of the deeds, a \Yhole series
of deeds, to a trustee, for delivery to the various grantees.
One of the deeds in the series was defective, in that there
was a slight gap. It did not close by perhaps 25 to 30 feet,
but it did contain positive expression of intent to close,
because it concluded "thence East 2.5 chains more or less
to the place of beginning." This court held :
''In the quoted phrase is expressed the intention that the tract close by extending the final
call to the place of beginning."
No such intention appears in the Ho\Yard deed. The
court, in the Losee case, held that 'vhere "the intent is
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rnanifest and clear that the tract is to close, and the distance call is surh that this rnay be done \Yithout violating
that call, \Ve conclude that it does close." In the How'"ard
case there is neither intent to close, nor can it be made
to close \vithout great violation to the call, nor can it be
determined from what point closure should be commenced. The Losee case therefore by i1nplication, indicates the Howard deed is not subject to closure.
The court then, in the Losee case, quotes from the
Park v. Wilkinson case, 21 l!tah 279, 60 P. 945, 946, in
which case also a line \vas supplied. There was a missing
course, but the next course followed up Canyon Creek,
and the other courses then went on around, back to the
point of beginning. All that the court added were the
words, "more or less to the center of Canyon Creek''
thereby extending, slightly one course.
The Losee case illustrates the point heretofore mentioned, that \vhen one of a series of deeds fails for \vant
of a sufficient description the course will amend the incorrect deed in order to effect justice and so that one heir
will not be deprived of his estate \vhile the other heirs
receive theirs because the other deeds in the series are
correct. Again, this comes under the rule stated by
Pomeroy, that reformation may be had in "performance
of a moral duty." Where, as here, justice does not demand reformation of the deed, then the general rule, as
stated by Patton, and quoted in the Losee case, v~ill prevail, to-wit :
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"Even when the lines are continuous, they
1nay fail to enclose any tract of land owing to
failure of the final line to return to the starting
point. Unless the description as stated, or as it
may be allowably construed, can be made to close,
the grant must fail." Losee v. Jones, supra, quoting Patton on Titles, Sec. 74, pg 265.

Reference is made by appellant to Ransberry v.
Broadheads, 174 A 97 (Pa 1934) cited in Losee v. Jones,
supra. There the place of beginning was a stone on the
east bank of the creek. The end of the description was
''thence crossing the creek * * * (sic) to a post on the east
bank of said creek; thence do,vn the same * * * (sic)
to the place of beginning." The court properly held
that such a description meant that the east bank of the
creek was to be the boundary line. The intent to close
and the means of establishing the closing line are apparent.
The venerable Wharton v. Garvin case, 3± Pa 340
(Pa. 1859) is next cited by appellant. Ilad appellant read
through the Wharton case she "~ould not have relied
thereon. There the "Test boundary "Tas the only boundary
in question. The deed itself defined the 'Yest line as
''North 35 degrees east 238 perches up along near said
river to a post." One side contended this line ran along
the river. The other side 1naintained it did not reach the
river. Far from establishing or creating an arbirtrary
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line the court held that the line must be placed exactly
where the deed said it was, "near'' the river, and not
''along" the river as the other side contended. The court
said: "A call, to stand a~ a boundary, must be indicated
to be such 'vith sufficient certainty to sho'v that it was so
intended."
The Blume v.ltlacGregor case cited by appellant falls
into that class of cases where there is, on the face of the
deed, such infonnation as will clear up the uncertainty.
As appellant states the court held: ''In vie'v of the fact
that this 1884 conveyance \vas expressed to be of 'a strip
of land' and 'for the right of way of its (grantee's) railroad,' the missing courses and distances fairly suggest
themselves on the face of the deed, bearing in mind the
'vell known fact that railroad rights of \Vay are commonly
strips of land of :1 uniform width." It is obvious that
\vhere there is on the face of the deed, such informa6on
that "the missing courses and distances fairly suggest
themselves" the deed may be upheld; but this case can
not be held to authorize a closing ",.hen the point from
",.hich the closing should commence is itself uncertain.
vVith the remainder of the quotations of generalla'v
fron1 Bh11ne 1'. 1llacGregor, respondents have no quarrel.
They are correct statements of the law as applied to certain situations, but not as applied to the Howard deedexcept the last paragraph 'vhich "'"ill be dicussed under
Point 9.
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POINT 9.
ATTEMPTED CONVEYANCE OF A SPECIFIC PORTION
OF A LARGER TRACT IS VOID FOR UNCERTAINTY IF
THE PORTION IS NOT SPECIFICALLY DEFINED.

Appellant states on page 18 of her brief, if the des~
cription is indefinite a statement of the quantity may help
to locate the boundaries. Appellant states, "The grantor
conveyed to defendant 2.75 acres more or less. In order
to convey this acreage it is necessary to surround a tract
of land. By supplying the last call grantor would have
conveyed approximately the acreage called for by the
deed." THIS STATEMENT IS WRONG AND MISLEADING. T·he deed, if closed by ignoring the west jog,
would cover approximately TvVICE 2.75 acres, and if
the west jog is included it would cover 6.58 acres.
If the grantor intended to convey anything, which
respondents deny, then all he intended to convey was 2.75
acres. The "more or less" cannot be held to permit twice
the specified acreage to pass. More or less is limited to
small quantities. In National Cyli1uler Gas Co. v. Packwood Mfg. Co., 208 SW2 825 (~fo App.) the court held:
''More or less is a term used to cover small
errors of surveying apportionate to size of tract
and in case of small city lot it cannot be construed
to include 15.95 additional feet."
If it should be conceded that L. W. Ho,vard intended
to convey 2.75 acres the question is vVHAT 2.75 acres 1
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An attempted conveyance of an undefined portion of a
large tract is void for uncertainty, as 'viii be sho"rn by
authorities hereinafter set forth.
Simple arithmetic shows that appellant, by raising
the question of acreage, puts her finger on still another
fatal ambiguity in the deed. Even assuming, as appellant so strenuously argues, that the last portion of the
description should be discarded ; even assuming the 1nost
favorable position appellant can claim, and \vhich she
seeks to have the court establish, to-wit: running a
straight line from the end of the fifth course to the place
of begining, we would have left a description far in excess of 2.75 acres. Actually the square footage of the
tract appellant proposes is 270,914.6 square feet. N O\V
deduct from this the Temple and Woods description,
160x150 feet or 24,000 square feet, and the theatre feet,
or more than five acres. Which two and a half acres
did he NOT INTEND to convey1 How can the court;
how can anyone g,uess what he intended to convey ·and
what he intended to retain. It simply cannot be done. Appellant, incidentally, cannot exclude the Continental Oil
tract. That was not deeded until1951, six years after the
execution of the deed 'vhich appellant seeks to refor1n.
Now, if we add the west jog, the total acreage is 6.38
acres, almost two and a half times the expressed 2.75
acres.
The courts cannot expand a man's generosity by
construing a gift to cover more than he said it \vas to
cover.
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Furthennore, when a grantor attempts to convey a
portion of a larger tract, and unsuccessfully attempts to
define the particular acreage to be conveyed, the recitation of the acreage will not help.
In Peel v. CalaiJs, 26 SE2 916 an effort was made to
sustain a deed where the description did not return to
the point of beginning. The last portion of the description read:
"To a stake 300 feet from John Peel' line:
thence with said line to the river, containing 22
acres more or less."
The court held such description to be void for uncertainty. It said:
"The call for the river is as the terminus of a
line and not as a natural boundary. There is no
language used sufficient to extend the line from
that point so as to enclose locus in quo. Even if we
concede that the general description adjoining the
lands of John Peel, Griffin and others' is sufficient, by resort to extrinsic evidence to supply
the line from the original beginning point to the
river on the western side of the land in controversy, the fact still remains that there is no attempt to close t lz e calls, (emphasis added) so as
to embrace the land along the river. Hence the
deed does not set forth any subject matter certain
in itself."
The sam·e case "~as again presented to the North
Carolina Supreme Court, in an effort to n1ake the description good BEC~AI;SE OF THE REFEREN"CE TO
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ACREAGE. At a later hearing, in Peel v. Calais, 31 SE2
-140, the court rejected this eff or saying:
~'While

acreage may at times be material, it
is not sufficient here to overcome the vagueness
and uncertainty in other respects."
Appellant, at page 19 of her brief, quotes from
American Jurisprudence a general rule that a conveyance
of a given number of acres out of a specified tract is not
void for failure to locate the part conveyed. That, however, is not the situation in the Howard deed. There the
attempt 'vas, if a valid conveyance \Vas even intended, to
describe a specific tract, and the addition of the acreage was incidental only. This is vastly different from
a deed expressly conveying a specified number of acres
out of a specific larger tract. It is to conveyances of this
kind that A1nerican Jurisprudence applies the rule cited
by appellant. The I'ule applicable to the Ho,vard deed is
likewise referred to in the quotation from A1nerican
Jurisprudence, in the following words:
"In a few cases, however, conveyances have
been held to be ineffectual and void for uncertainty where the land is described merely as a fractional part of a designated tract or where in
addition to giving the acreage the deed ineffectively attempts to looate specifically the lan.d
conveyed." (16 Am. Jur. 587, n. 11)
Far fro1n there being but a few cases so holding,
there are innumerable such cases. Patton assembles a
number of such cases under the rule:
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"For instance, a conveyance of a certain number of acres or of a certain number of feet of a
tract, without giving the location in the tract, of
the part conveyed, is generally held void for uncertainty." Authorities cited. Patton on Titles,
page 219, note 125.
The paragraph quoted by appellant from 16 Am. Jur.
587, continues on the follo,ving page, page 588, as follow8:
"The rule that a description of land, merely
as a part of a tract sufficiently definite, does not
apply, however, where the grantor intenAls to convey a specific part of a tract of land precisely
described by metes and bounds, and puts in the
conveyance a .description of a specific tract which
is ineffectual to convey that specific tract; in such
cases, where the obvious intention is to convey a
particular part of some tract definitely marked
out, and nothing else, and a description of that
part is insufficient, the conveyance fails altogether."
Contrary to the so-called general rule, cited by appellant from 16 Am. Jur 587, but 'vhich Am. Jur. itself qualifies, both in a later part of the same paragraph and in the
pocket parts, the correct rule is the statement from 117
A.L.R. 1073, which reads as follo,vs :
"Notwithstanding occasional statements of
contrary ilnport the decisions as a whole clearly
show that a deed "'"hich, being so drawn as to have
in contemplation as the subject of conveyance a
specific part of a tract of land presmnably owned
by the grantor, does not attempt definitely to
locate the part, referring to it 1nerely as so many
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acres or other indicated quantity of land of the
larger tract, is to say the least, ineffective as a
legal conveyance, if not utterly void for all purposes."
C.J .S. states the rule thus :
"A deed conveying part of a tract must contain a description of the part intended to be
conveyed so as to identify that part definitely.
Where there is no attempt to locate the part intended the deed may be construed to convey an
undivided interest in the larger tract; but t hilS rule
does not apply to an indefinite descripti·on of the
specific portion intended." 26 C.J.S. Sec. 30, pg.
649
Actually, from an examination of the Howard deed
it becomes obvious that he did not intend to convey 2.75
acres out of a larger tract. The addition of the acreage
was incidental only, and as stated in Peel v. Calais, supra,
the addition thereof "is· not sufficient here to overcome
the vagueness and uncertainty in other respects.''
Appellants reference to the ordinance in the Central
niission Oil illustrates the extremes to which appellant
has had to resort to find authority. Being unable to find
a single deed which the courts have upheld 'vhere there
'vas no call going back to the place of beginning, she finally found an ordinance. But her quotation is self-defeatAppellants' reference to the ordinance in the Central
ing. The reference therein to Deal v. Cooper, 94 NW 62.,
shows that an omission may be supplied where "there is
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sufficient data furnished by the deed to supply this omission." This cannot help the Howard deed where there is
nothing in the deed itself to help supply the omission or
to indicate any intent to go back to the place of beginning.
CONCLlTSION
From the admissions of appellant, the deed which is
before the court, and the foregoing statement of authorities, the following facts app·ear:

The decedent, L. W. Howard, ten years before
his death, made a deed to be recorded after his
death. Deliberately, or by accident, this deed contained a description which did not purport to
close, and which contained a fatal ambiguity. T'\YO
years after this first deed he made another deed,
with a correct description, covering a small part
of the srune tract. After his death both deeds '\vere
recorded by the '''"idow, stepmother of respondents. If the defective deed is reformed by the court
almost the '\vhole of decedents estate '\Yill go to the
wido,v, and the children of the first marriage '\vill
be virtually disinherited.
From these findings of fact the follo,ving conclusions
of law arise :
1. There are no facts before the court indicating the decedent intended to make a present
gift of a p,re8ent interest to appellant.

2. The deed, containing patent ambiguity
and patent defect in not purporting to close, is
void for uncertainty.
3. The deed, being a testamentary disposition of estate, is not susceptible to reforn1ation in
equity.
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4. Even if it were possible for an equity
court to reform the deed it would not be equitable
to do so where the effect would be to cause injustice and inequity.
5. The deed, containing nothing giving the
key to extrinsic evidence, there was no point in
setting the matter for trial and the District c·ourt
properly granted Judgment on the Pleadings in
favor of respondent.
Respectfully submitted,

PERRIS S. JENSEN
Attorneys for Respondents.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

